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1968]

THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

namely, whether the injury has occurred in New York. In Spectacular Pronw ions, Inc. v. Radio Station WING, 5 3 plaintiff was
a national publicity firm with offices in New York. It alleged
unfair competition by the defendant, an Ohio resident not doing
business in New York, for altering one of plaintiff's announcements and broadcasting it in Ohio for a competitor's benefit.
In ascertaining the most reasonable and fair locus of injury
for jurisdictional purposes, the court emphasized the foreseeability
test of CPLR 302(a)(3) and posed three possible forums for
trial of the unfair competition action: the plaintiff's principal place
of business, any place the plaintiff does business, and the place
where the business was lost. The first possibility was rejected
because of the absence of a predictable relationship between the
principal place of business and defendant's tortious act.54 As to
the second possibility, the court observed that a large national
corporation should not be entitled to sue in any state in which
it does business. Granting such latitude to plaintiff, stressed the
court, would obviously be unfair to the defendant.
The court adopted the businessman's concept of injury, and
concluded that the place where one loses customers is the most
foreseeable forum for suit in an unfair competition action. At
this situs there would be a reasonable relation between the defendant and the nation-wide plaintiff corporation. It would be here
that all the critical events took place and here there would be
minimum contacts by the defendant to satisfy the Hanson v. Denckla requirements.5 5 The court, in conclusion, analogized plaintiff
to "a man with his trunk and head in one state and his limbs
and fingers spread over many others. If one finger is bruised,
the whole body-including each of the fingers-is weakened. Most
would agree, however, that the injury is localized in one finger." 5r
ARTICLE

6-

JOINDER OF

CLAIMS,

CONSOLIDATION

AND SEVERANCE

CPLR 602: No consolidation or joint trial of actions for personal
injuries and declaratory judgment of non-coverage.
CPLR 602(a) gives the court discretion to grant a motion
for joint trial of any or all matters in issue where the pending
actions involve a common question of law or fact. This provision
is primarily designed to avoid the danger of divergent decisions
on a similar issue.
272 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
541d. at 737.
55357 U.S. 235 (1958).
6 Spectacular Promotions, Inc., v. Radio Station WING, 272 F. Supp.
734, 737 (ED.N.Y. 1967).
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In Bogucki v. Mednis,57 defendant-insured moved under this
section to have an action by his insurer for a declaration of noncoverage on his insurance policy joined with two personal injury
actions pending against him. The Supreme Court, Monroe County,
denied the motion, holding that the facts of the accident had
nothing in common with the question of timely notice to the
insurer.
The present tendency is to permit consolidation whenever
possible, irrespective of the diversity of the issues. s For example,
consolidation is allowed where both actions arose from the same
accident, involve substantially the same questions of law or fact
except as to damages, and the same witnesses would testify in
both actions. 59 Despite the desirability of avoiding multiplicity of
suits and mitigating costs and expenses, however, consolidation
will not be allowed where there is no substantially similar question
of law or fact. As in Bogucki, consolidation was denied in Gibbons v. Groat,60 where the only common factor was the similarity
of parties.
ARTICLE

31 -

DISCLOSURE

CPLR 3101(a): Disclosure of names and addresses of witnesses
present at the accident not required for pre-trial hearing.
In Alongis v. City of New York,'61 the Supreme Court, Kings
County, held that a party is not required to furnish the names
and addresses of witnesses to the City in a hearing that is preliminary to the commencement of an action. Although the decision
was based on an interpretation of Section 93d-1.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York and Section 50-h of the
General Municipal Law, an analogy to the CPLR may be drawn.
CPLR 3101(a) allows for the disclosure of names and
addresses of witnesses only where the identity of such witnesses
is "material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action. . . ." Even if it is material and necessary, a further limitation exists. CPLR 3101(c) and (d) respectively make nonattainable the work product of an attorney and, qualifiedly, any
material prepared for litigation unless that material can no longer
be duplicated and withholding it will result in injustice or undue
N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1967).
58 Dasheff v. Bath, 25 Misc. 2d 13, 15, 206 N.Y.S.2d 733, 736 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y.
County 1959) (two negligence actions consolidated).
59
Berger v. Long Island R.R., 24 App. Div. 2d 509, 261 N.Y.S.2d 575
(2d Dep't 1965).
6022 App. Div. 2d 996, 254 N.Y.S.2d 843 (3d Dep't 1964) (mem.).
6154 Misc. 2d 771, 283 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1967).
5 54 Misc. 2d 342, 282

